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In February 1944, in his sixty-ninth year, Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) broke his foot and, 
while laid up in hospital, suffered a heart attack. He then had a near-death experience, during 
which he found himself to be floating a thousand miles above the earth (over Ceylon, now Sri 
Lanka). He underwent a painful process in which he was stripped of all his earthly attachments 
and was about to enter a stone temple on a meteorite where he would discover the meaning of his 
life, when he was called back to the earth by the spirit of his doctor (Jung, 1963/1995, pp. 320–
324). Over several nights while recovering in hospital, he experienced a series of further visions 
in which he felt himself to be “in the womb of the universe” (p. 324) and witnessed, or 
participated in, or in some way “was,” the “mystery of the conjunction,” expressed in Jewish 
mystical (Kabbalistic) terms as the marriage of Tiphereth and Malchuth or Rabbi Simon ben 
Jochai’s wedding in the afterlife, in Christian terms as the “Marriage of the Lamb,” and in Greek 
mythological terms as the consummation of the sacred marriage (hierosgamos) of Zeus and Hera 
(p. 325). He described the visions as “extremely strange” (p. 320), “the most tremendous things I 
have ever experienced” (p. 326), and “utterly real” (p. 327).1 
 From his student days in the late 1890s until his death in 1961, Jung experienced, 
observed, and studied an astonishing range of paranormal and mystical phenomena (Main, 1997, 
2012). His personal experiences included apparently telepathic, clairvoyant, and precognitive 
dreams and fantasies (Jung, 1963/1995, pp. 159–160, 200–201, 333–335); psychokinetic and 
poltergeist activity (pp. 125–127, 178–179); apparitions and hauntings (pp. 215–216; 
1950/1977d); meaningful coincidences (1952/1969i, paras. 843–845; 1963/1995, pp. 207–208); 
altered states of consciousness involving both spontaneous and induced visions (2009); and the 
above-described near-death experience and accompanying mystical visions (1963/1995, pp. 320–
329). As a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, Jung heard accounts of similar experiences from his 
patients (1952/1969i, para. 816). Through attending séances, he witnessed the apparent 
possession of mediums and the materialization of spirits (1902/1957; 1973, pp. 100, 511). And in 
his last decade, he assiduously collected documents about the then emerging phenomenon of 
UFOs (1954/1977g, para. 1431; 1958/1970b). Throughout his life, he read extensively in the 
literature of psychical research and parapsychology (1952/1969i, paras. 830–839; 1963/1995, p. 
120; 1973, p. 166), and he carried out parapsychological experiments of his own, including 
laboratory tests of mediums (1905/1977h) and collecting and statistically analyzing astrological 
data (1952/1969i, paras. 872–915). Based on his experiences, observations, and studies, he 
published three books on such phenomena (1902/1957, 1952/1969i, 1958/1970b), as well as 
numerous shorter papers.2 
 Jung’s openness to extraordinary experiences profoundly influenced the development of 
his psychological theory, not only at the outset of his career but also at key points throughout it 
(Charet, 1993; Main, 1997, pp. 1–44). His openness also consolidated his opposition to 
materialism (1916/1948/1969b, para. 529; 1952/1969i, para. 960; 1955–1956/1970a, para. 763), 
to narrowly rationalistic approaches to science (1963/1995, p. 336), and to the pervasive cultural 
condition of disenchantment (Weber, 1919/1948, pp. 139, 155) or, as he called it, the 
“despiritualization” (Jung, 1938/1940/1969g, paras. 140, 141) or “desacralization” of the world 
(McGuire & Hull, 1978, p. 230; see Main, 2012, pp. 25–27)—all of which, he felt, were 
incompatible with the kinds of data he had encountered. The pivotal concept that emerged 
specifically from Jung’s engagement with these topics and issues was synchronicity, a principle 
of acausal connection through meaning (1952/1969i), which he then deployed to establish the 
reality, explain the dynamics, and, not least, interpret the meaning of extraordinary experiences 
(Main, 1997, 2004, 2007, 2012). 
 
The Recalcitrant Case of Introvertive Mystical Experience 
 
About one extraordinary phenomenon, however, Jung long remained skeptical: the claimed 
egoless and contentless awareness of introvertive mysticism (1939/1968e, para. 320; 
1939/1954/1969e, paras. 774, 817–818). This may appear to be a small limitation in an otherwise 
strikingly open system of thought. But it does seemingly put Jung at odds with an extensive body 
of empirical data about mysticism, including many impressive first-person accounts (Stace, 
1960/1973, pp. 88–111), and in Irreducible Mind (Kelly, Kelly, Crabtree, Gauld, Grosso, & 
Greyson, 2007) Edward Kelly and Michael Grosso (2007) understandably identify this limitation 
as compromising the adequacy of Jung’s theoretical model when it comes to accounting for 
mystical experiences (pp. 555–557). 
 The term “introvertive mysticism” is taken from Walter Stace’s classic study Mysticism 
and Philosophy (1960/1973). Stace identifies two main types of mystical experience, 
extrovertive (“outward-turning”) and introvertive (“inward-turning”). “The essential difference 
between them,” he writes, “is that the extrovertive experience looks outward through the senses, 
while the introvertive looks inward into the mind” (p. 61). He continues: 
 
Both culminate in the perception of an ultimate Unity—what Plotinus called the 
One—with which the perceiver realizes his own union or even identity. But the 
extrovertive mystic, using his physical senses, perceives the multiplicity of 
external material objects—the sea, the sky, the houses, the trees—mystically 
transfigured so that the One, or the Unity, shines through them. The introvertive 
mystic, on the contrary, seeks by deliberately shutting off the senses, by 
obliterating from consciousness the entire multiplicity of sensations, images, and 
thoughts, to plunge into the depths of his own ego. There, in that darkness and 
silence, he alleges that he perceives the One—and is united with it—not as a 
Unity seen through a multiplicity (as in the extrovertive experience), but as the 
wholly naked One devoid of any plurality whatever. (pp. 61–62) 
 
Stace himself considered introvertive mystical experiences to be a higher type than extrovertive 
mystical experiences (pp. 132–133), the latter being “a sort of incomplete version of the 
completeness realized in the introvertive kind” (p. 133). As Paul Marshall (2005) has 
highlighted, this ranking is by no means universally agreed among experiencers and theorists of 
mysticism.3 He discusses the case of Robert Forman, for example, who, drawing on the 
framework of Transcendental Meditation and hence ultimately of Upanishadic thought (pp. 170–
172), presents a sequence of mystical development in which the introvertive state, referred to as 
a pure consciousness event, is a lesser attainment (p. 167). More advanced attainments include a 
dualistic mystical state, in which pure consciousness is experienced “alongside but separately 
from ordinary awareness of objects” (p. 167); and then, as a further development, a unitive 
mystical state, in which “Consciousness is no longer separate from its objects” (p. 168). This 
unitive mystical state resembles Stace’s extrovertive mystical experience. But because it unites 
consciousness and the world rather than keeps them apart, it is considered more unitary and 
hence more advanced than the pure consciousness event, which resembles Stace’s introvertive 
mystical experience (p. 168). However, whether more or less advanced, introvertive mystical 
states are still widely reported to occur, and it would be a serious limitation if Jung’s theory were 
unable to give a satisfactory account of them. 
 Kelly and Grosso note two respects in which Jung’s psychological model seems 
inadequate to account for introvertive mystical experience. First, they challenge Jung’s claim that 
mystical experiences are always archetypal. This cannot be true of all mystical experiences, they 
argue, “for archetypes only reach overt expression in the form of images, broadly construed, and 
as maintained by Stace and others the innermost core of mystical experience unfolds in a region 
beyond images and all other distinctive mental particulars” (Kelly & Grosso, 2007, p. 557). This 
characterization of archetypes can indeed be readily supported with reference to Jung, for 
example when he writes: “what we mean by ‘archetype’ is in itself irrepresentable, but has 
effects which make visualizations of it possible, namely, the archetypal images and ideas” 
(1947/1954/1969c, para. 417). 
 Second and more seriously, Kelly and Grosso argue that Jung was “systematically unable 
to come fully to grips with introvertive mystical experiences” because of his conviction that “the 
ego is the primary bearer of consciousness” (2007, p. 557). For Jung, as Kelly and Grosso 
understand him: 
 
[D]isappearance of the ordinary conscious ego during a numinous encounter with 
the collective unconscious can only mean that the conscious ego has been flooded, 
or contaminated, or engulfed by the inherently dark contents of the unknown part 
of the psyche. As a result, consciousness itself supposedly dims or contracts, 
ultimately to some sort of void, nothingness, or state of egoless unconsciousness . 
. . This kind of description of mystical states . . . , which follows from Jung’s 
strong identification of consciousness with the ordinary ego, is flatly contradicted 
by the unanimous testimony of great mystics of all times and places that their 
highest states are not dim or unconscious, but if anything “superconscious.” (p. 
557) 
 
 There is also ample evidence in Jung to support this characterization of his position. 
Contrasting Western and Eastern styles of thinking, Jung (1939/1954/1969e) wrote in his 
“Psychological Commentary on ‘The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation’”: 
 
To us, consciousness is inconceivable without an ego; it is equated with the 
relation of contents to an ego. If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of 
anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to the conscious process. The Eastern 
mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego. 
Consciousness is deemed capable of transcending its ego condition; indeed, in its 
“higher” forms, the ego disappears altogether. Such an ego-less mental condition 
can only be unconscious to us, for the simple reason that there would be nobody 
to witness it. I do not doubt the existence of mental states transcending 
consciousness. But they lose their consciousness to exactly the same degree that 
they transcend consciousness. I cannot imagine a conscious mental state that does 
not relate to a subject, that is, to an ego. The ego may be depotentiated—divested, 
for instance, of its awareness of the body—but so long as there is awareness of 
something, there must be somebody who is aware. (para. 774) 
 
Later in the same paper, Jung describes yoga, “India’s most important exercise,” as “an 
immersion in what we would call an unconscious state” (para. 911). “It makes no difference,” he 
asserts elsewhere, “whether [the yogis] call our unconscious a ‘universal consciousness’; the fact 
remains that in their case the unconscious has swallowed up ego-consciousness” (1939/1968e, 
para. 520). Jung acknowledges that “a correct application of the methods described in the Pāli 
Canon or in the Yoga-sūtra [can induce] a remarkable extension of consciousness,” but 
immediately adds that “with increasing extension, the contents of consciousness lose in clarity of 
detail,” such that “consciousness becomes all-embracing, but nebulous; an infinite number of 
things merge into an indefinite whole, a state in which subject and object are almost completely 
identical” (para. 520). 
 Kelly and Grosso (2007) draw a contrast between Jung’s model and that of Frederic 
Myers: 
 
The ingredient crucially absent from the Jungian model . . . is precisely Myers’s 
central theoretical move, his repudiation of that identification [of consciousness 
with the ordinary ego] in favor of his [Myers’s] own core conception of the 
Subliminal Self—“a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, 
which for the most part remains potential only,” but which expresses itself in 
greater or lesser degree as a function of fluctuating conditions in the organism. 
(pp. 557–558, citing Myers, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 12) 
 
Later, in Beyond Physicalism (Kelly, Crabtree, & Marshall, 2015), Kelly (2015) acknowledges 
that in fact “Jung makes a structurally equivalent distinction between ego and Self [to that made 
by Myers]” (p. 545n20). However, the self that Jung postulates is still inferior to that postulated 
by Myers (and similarly by William James) in terms of its ability to account for mystical 
experiences. Writes Kelly: 
 
Jung’s Self . . . lies within the collective unconscious, which later became the 
unus mundus . . . and unlike the Myers–James Subliminal Self it is inherently 
dark, unconscious, and inaccessible except by way of its symbolic products. 
Allegiance to this conception caused Jung to describe mystical experiences 
consistently, and in flagrant contradiction with the first-person reports, as a 
dimming or darkening of everyday consciousness as it becomes flooded or 
overwhelmed by unconscious contents. (p. 545n20) 
  
 The above criticisms of Jung’s model are serious ones, not least as they have been made 
by attentive readers of Jung who are generally very favorable about his thought (Kelly & Grosso, 
2007, p, 555; Kelly et al., 2007, pp. 334, 479, 481; Kelly et al., 2015, pp. 195–226). Similar 
criticisms have also occurred to other sympathetic scholars examining the ability of Jung’s 
psychology to account for mystical states, especially as articulated in Indian philosophy 
(Coward, 1985; Kakar, 1994, pp. 268–272; Schipke, 2019; Whitney, 2017). In this chapter, I 
assess to what extent these criticisms might be answerable. I do so in three stages. First, I look at 
Jung’s own mystical visions experienced late in his life, which, I argue, contain elements of 
introvertive mysticism. Second, I consider how Jung’s mature psychological model might be 
able to account theoretically for introvertive mystical experiences. I attend in particular to Jung’s 
characterizations of the archetype of the self as well as to some late formulations of the 
relationship between the ego and the self, which suggest how experiencing “pure consciousness” 
might after all be compatible with Jung’s claim that consciousness depends on the ego. Third, 
despite Jung’s own reservations about philosophy, I argue that the apparent contradictions in his 
theorizing of mysticism can be resolved, or at least eased, by viewing his thought as underpinned 
by an implicit metaphysics of panentheism. 
  
Jung’s Mystical Near-Death Experience of 1944 
 
Before looking at Jung’s mystical near-death experience in more detail, it will be helpful to 
clarify further Stace’s distinction between extrovertive and introvertive mystical experiences, as 
well as to supplement it with a more recent taxonomy. One of Stace’s main aims in Mysticism 
and Philosophy was to identify a common core of mystical experiences. Accordingly, most of 
the specific features he identifies of extrovertive and introvertive experiences are shared. Thus 
the two types are both characterized by a sense of objectivity or reality; by blessedness, peace, 
and similar strong positive emotions; by a feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine; by 
paradoxicality; and by ineffability (1960/1973, pp. 131–132; Kelly & Grosso, 2007, p. 504). 
However, as already noted, the two types differ in how they characterize the experience of unity, 
which according to Stace represents “the very inner essence of all mystical experience” and is 
deemed by mystics to be “in some sense ultimate and basic to the world” (1960/1973, p. 132). In 
extrovertive mysticism the unity is experienced as a “Unifying Vision” in which “all things are 
One” and there is “The more concrete apprehension of the One as an inner subjectivity, or life, in 
all things” (p. 131).4 In introvertive mysticism, by contrast, the unity is experienced as “Unitary 
Consciousness; the One, the Void; pure consciousness” and as “nonspatial” and “nontemporal” 
(p. 131).5 Kelly and Grosso also highlight what is in effect a third quality of introvertive mystical 
experiences implied by Stace (1960/1973, pp. 112–123), namely, a radical transformation from 
an ordinary sense of self to “a vastly amplified sense of self . . . that almost inevitably 
experiences itself as in a state of direct contact, or union, or identity with some reality variably 
conceived as a Universal Self, the One, the Absolute, the Ground of Being, or God” (Kelly & 
Grosso, pp. 507–508). 
 In order to avoid some of the confusions generated by Stace’s claim that extrovertive 
experience is, as the term suggests, “always directed ‘outward’ through the sense organs” (p. 18), 
Marshall (2019) offers a slightly more differentiated taxonomy, which will be helpful when 
looking at Jung’s experiences. He distinguishes between what he calls “This-worldly mystical 
experience,” characterized as “mystical experience of the natural world or some region or 
content of it, whether or not experienced through the familiar senses” (p. 18); “Other-worldly 
mystical experience,” characterized as “mystical experience of a world or some of its contents 
(e.g., places, beings, objects) fundamentally distinct from our familiar universe” (p. 19); and 
“No-worldly mystical experience,” characterized as “mystical experience of something beyond 
all worlds, this-worldly and other-worldly, and all their contents” (p. 19). Marshall also 
highlights the possibility of “mixed experiences” (p. 20), which may be composed of elements or 
phases that are variously this-worldly, other-worldly, and no-worldly. 
 In the chapter-long account Jung gave of his mystical experiences in Memories, Dreams, 
Reflections (1963/1995, pp. 320–329) it is not hard to detect all the characteristics that 
introvertive mysticism shares with extrovertive mysticism in Stace’s classification.6 About the 
objectivity and reality of his experience Jung was in no doubt: “It was not a product of 
imagination,” he wrote. “The visions and experiences were utterly real; there was nothing 
subjective about them; they all had a quality of absolute objectivity” (pp. 326–327). He was also 
explicit about the strong positive emotion associated with the experiences: “It was as if I were in 
an ecstasy . . . filled with the highest possible feeling of happiness” (pp. 324–325). That there 
was, more specifically, a feeling of the sacred is indicated by Jung’s statement that, at the time of 
the visions, “Everything around [him] seemed enchanted” (p. 325) and “There was a pneuma of 
inexpressible sanctity in the [hospital] room,” which “had a magical atmosphere” (p. 326). The 
paradoxicality that Stace noted as another typical feature of mystical experiences was expressed 
both by Jung’s statement that his being stripped of his attachments gave him “a feeling of 
extreme poverty, but at the same time of great fullness” (p. 322) and by his claim that, within the 
experience, “The only thing that feeling could grasp would be a sum, an iridescent whole 
containing all at once expectation of a beginning, surprise at what is now happening, and 
satisfaction or disappointment with the result of what happened” (p. 327). Finally, Jung 
acknowledged the ineffability of his experience: he reported thinking during the experience itself 
that “This cannot be described; it is far too wonderful!” (p. 325), and he reflected afterwards that 
“It is impossible to convey the beauty and intensity of emotion during those visions” (p. 326). 
 Jung’s mystical visions were for the most part not contentless, and for that reason would 
mostly fall into Stace’s class of extrovertive experiences. However, some parts of the visions 
were almost certainly not perceived, as Stace stipulates, “using [the] physical senses” 
(1960/1973, p. 61). This is where Marshall’s distinction between this-worldly and other-worldly 
experiences becomes useful. Some elements of Jung’s visions definitely involved his actual 
perceptual world, albeit transfigured, such as when he saw the hospital nurse who brought him 
his food as “an old Jewish woman, much older than she actually was, . . . preparing [for him] 
ritual kosher dishes” (1963/1995, p. 325). But other elements, such as his vision of being 
suspended in space and then approaching the stone temple on the meteorite (pp. 320–323), 
seeing the spirit of his doctor floating toward him “in his primal form as a basileus of Kos” (pp. 
322–323), and above all the Jewish, Christian, and ancient Greek visions of the mystic marriage 
(p. 325) are better viewed as other-worldly. For in these parts of the experience Jung appears to 
have been seeing a visionary reality that was drawing on memories of sensory experience rather 
than a sensory reality that had been transfigured. 
 Most crucial, though, for addressing the claim that Jung’s model cannot adequately 
account for introvertive mystical experience is the extent to which his visions may themselves 
include elements that Stace considered unique to such experience. Considering first the qualities 
of being nonspatial and nontemporal (Stace, 1960/1973, p. 131), we find various approximations 
to these in the form of altered spatiality and altered temporality. For example, despite Jung’s use 
of numerous and often quite precise spatial and geographical references—“high up in space,” 
“far below my feet,” “Ceylon,” “the subcontinent of India,” “standing with my back to the Indian 
Ocean, as it were,” and so on (1963/1995, pp. 320–321)—it seems clear that most of his 
experience did not take place in an ordinary spatial environment. Nor, at times, did he have a 
normal spatial relationship to the content of his visions. Of his vision of “the marriage of 
Malchuth and Tifereth,” for instance, he writes: “I do not know exactly what part I played in it. 
At bottom it was myself; I was the marriage” (p. 325); and more generally, quoting Part Two of 
Goethe’s Faust, he describes how he “floated in a state of purest bliss, ‘thronged round with 
images of all creation’” (p. 326). However, such altered spatiality is still far from being 
nonspatial. With Jung’s descriptions of altered temporality, the approximation to being 
completely nontemporal gets much closer: “We shy away from the word ‘eternal,’” he writes, 
“but I can describe the experience only as the ecstasy of a non-temporal state in which present, 
past, and future are one. Everything that happens in time had been brought together into a 
concrete whole. Nothing was distributed over time, nothing could be measured by temporal 
concepts” (p. 327). Even here, though, despite Jung’s use of the word “non-temporal,” a question 
mark remains over whether he is referring to complete transcendence of time, as Stace seems to 
require for introvertive mysticism, or to temporal inclusiveness, in which all time comes 
together, a kind of experience that can also be found in content-rich extrovertive mysticism.7 
Jung’s experience also evinces various approximations to the kind of radical 
transformation from an ordinary sense of self to the “vastly amplified sense of self” that 
characterizes the unitary consciousness achieved in introvertive mystical experience (Kelly & 
Grosso, 2007, p. 507; Marshall, 2005, p. 55), an experience, in fact, which for Stace (1960/1973) 
implies that “the individual self . . . must lose its individuality, cease to be a separate individual, 
and lose its identity because lost or merged in the One, or Absolute, or God” (p. 111). Jung 
(1963/1995) reports that during his vision of floating above the earth he had “the feeling that 
everything was being sloughed away; everything I aimed at or wished for or thought, the whole 
phantasmagoria of earthly existence, fell away or was stripped from me—an extremely painful 
process. Nevertheless, something remained . . . I consisted of my own history, and I felt with 
great certainty: this is what I am” (p. 321). Here Jung attains a greater or more essential self but 
still seems to have individuality. Later in his account, though, he does seem to be attempting to 
articulate an experience not unlike Stace’s merger with the One, when he describes how he felt 
that his identity was “interwoven into an indescribable whole,” which he was yet able to observe 
“with complete objectivity” (p. 327). 
However, we find the strongest indication of introvertive mystical experience in Jung’s 
account when we turn to Stace’s remaining and most important defining characteristic of such 
experiences, that is, their being experiences of “Unitary Consciousness; the One, the Void; pure 
consciousness” (1960/1973, p. 131). For Stace, this is in fact “the one basic, essential, nuclear 
characteristic, from which most of the others inevitably follow” (p. 110). The characteristic does 
not appear directly in the greater part of Jung’s account, for his experiences were primarily 
visionary and ipso facto not void or contentless. However, there were repeated moments when he 
did seem to enter into a state describable in terms of Stace’s nuclear characteristic. Jung 
(1963/1995) relates how while in hospital he would wake up each night around midnight “in an 
utterly transformed state” (p. 324). “I felt as though I were floating in space,” he writes, “as 
though I were safe in the womb of the universe—in a tremendous void, but filled with the 
highest possible feeling of happiness” (p. 324). This womb-like void, paradoxically “filled” with 
happiness, precisely evokes the concept of the “vacuum-plenum” (“emptiness-fullness”) that 
Stace uses to characterize the contentless nature of introvertive mystical experience (1960/1973, 
pp. 161–178; Kelly & Grosso, 2007, p. 507). As Stace notes, an experience of the void is 
necessarily nonspatial and nontemporal, and also presupposes complete loss or merger of 
individuality in the One; it is, in Jung’s apt expression, “an utterly transformed state.” 
 In the conclusion of their discussion of the problem of a universal core of mystical 
experience, Kelly and Grosso (2007) suggest that the “extreme developments” of introvertive 
mystical experience may be “most concisely encapsulated by the famous Vedic formula ‘Sat–
Chit–Ananda’—pure being or existence, pure awareness or consciousness, and pure bliss, 
amplified without limit” (p. 510). We can note, finally, that each part of this formula is reflected 
in Jung’s (1963/1995) account: he felt that he “existed in an objective form” (p. 322), he 
accessed “objective cognition” (p. 328), and he was “filled with . . . eternal bliss” (pp. 324–
325).8 
 Jung’s mystical experiences of 1944 were far from being his only visionary experiences. 
Above all, the earlier visions he experienced between 1913 and 1916 and recorded and reflected 
on in his now published Red Book (2009) were also remarkable in many ways and had a seminal 
influence on his subsequent theoretical and practical work.9 However, it is only in the account of 
his 1944 experiences that we find strong indications of Jung actually having experienced 
introvertive mystical states. This may be significant inasmuch as all the passages cited earlier in 
which he can be construed as denying the possibility of introvertive mystical experiences date 
from before 1944.10 That Jung’s 1944 visions and experiences may have forced him to 
reconsider his theoretical preconceptions on this point is also suggested by his admission that, 
prior to his visions, he “would never have imagined any such experience was possible” 
(1963/1995, pp. 326–327). 
 
Experience of the Self 
 
While there are thus indications that Jung may have experienced introvertive mystical states, the 
question remains whether his psychological model is able satisfactorily to account for such states 
or is, as Kelly and Grosso imply, irremediably hamstrung by its assumptions that consciousness 
depends on the ego and we can only know archetypes as images. In addressing this question I 
shall refer mainly to Jung’s writings that were published after 1944, which include some of his 
most important works: “The Psychology of the Transference” (1946/1966a), “On the Nature of 
the Psyche” (1947/1954/1969c), Aion (1951/1968b), “Answer to Job” (1952/1969a), 
“Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle” (1952/1969i), and Mysterium Coniuntionis 
(1955–1956/1970a). Jung stated that his mystical near-death visions had given him “the courage 
to undertake new formulations” (1963/1995, p. 328). These new formulations—which included 
richer articulations of the archetype of the self and its relations to the ego, of the distinction 
between the archetype-in-itself and the archetypal image, and of the concepts of synchronicity 
and unitary reality (the unus mundus)—are natural places to look for resources within Jung’s 
psychological model that might enable it to account for introvertive mystical states. Before 
directly addressing this issue, though, it may be helpful to provide a very brief overview of 
Jung’s psychological model. 
 Jung (1963/1995) described the objectivity he experienced in his visions as “part of a 
completed individuation” (p. 328). Individuation is the core process of his psychology and 
signifies the process of becoming a unique self through the ongoing synthesis of consciousness 
and the unconscious. Jung articulated this process in a variety of ways, of which the following is 
a summary (based mainly on Jung, 1928/1966b and 1951/1968b, paras. 1–67).11 For Jung, 
psychological development begins in childhood and early adulthood by one’s developing and 
strengthening an ego in order to deal with the forces that assail one from the social world without 
and the psychic world within. Such an ego is inevitably one-sided, having been forced by the 
pressures of its inner and outer environments to develop and thereby make conscious some 
potentialities at the expense of others, which remain unconscious. In Jung’s understanding, 
however, the unconscious has an innate drive toward expressing itself as a whole. An opposition 
is therefore set up between consciousness, centered on the ego, and the unconscious. From the 
unconscious, contents emerge spontaneously—for example, in the form of dreams, fantasies, 
symptoms, and acausal convergences of events—in order to compensate and regulate 
consciousness in the interests of greater overall realization of the unconscious. This process of 
encounter between the ego and the unconscious, which can be facilitated by psychotherapy and 
the deployment of techniques such as dream interpretation, transference analysis, and active 
imagination, is marked by the appearance of certain typical themes or problems, which demand 
to be integrated and made conscious. Such typical themes, problems, or “archetypes” needing to 
be encountered and integrated with the ego include above all the dark side of one’s personality 
(the “shadow”) and the contrasexual element of one’s personality (the “anima” or “animus”). 
When a sufficient level of integration has been achieved between ego-consciousness and these 
archetypes, there can emerge a new center of the psyche, a center no longer only of 
consciousness, as was the ego, but of both consciousness and the unconscious. This new center is 
what Jung called the self. The self is potentially there from the beginning as a kind of 
unconscious wholeness, but the aim of individuation is to realize it consciously. This is an 
extremely arduous, lifelong task, and it is full of pitfalls, not least the dangers of either the ego 
becoming excessively assimilated by the self or the self becoming excessively assimilated by the 
ego, both of which would result in pathological conditions, such as psychosis or inflation. 
“Conscious wholeness,” Jung wrote more favorably, “consists in a successful union of ego and 
self, so that both preserve their intrinsic qualities” (1947/1954/1969c, para. 430n128). 
 
The Archetype of Wholeness 
 
The centerpiece of Jung’s psychological model as well as the key to appreciating what he has to 
say about mysticism is the archetype of the self. He designated the self as “the archetype of 
orientation and meaning” (1963/1995, p. 224) and, perhaps most aptly, as “the archetype of 
wholeness” (1951/1968b, para. 351; 1952/1969a, para. 757; 1955–1956/1970a, para. 777). Like 
all archetypes, the self can give rise to innumerable symbolic expressions (“archetypal images”), 
the most important of which for Jung was the mandala, the sacred circle often represented as 
divided into quadrants (1934/1950/1968h; 1944/1968c, paras. 122–331; 1950/1968d; 1963/1995, 
pp. 220–224). He claimed that, for him personally, “finding the mandala as an expression of the 
self . . . was . . . the ultimate” (1963/1995, p. 222). He also stressed the nature of the self as a 
coincidence, complexity, or conjunction of opposites (coincidentia/complexio/coniunctio 
oppositorum) (see especially 1951/1968b, 1955–1956/1970a); and, with great significance for his 
entire psychology of religion, he repeatedly equated the self with the God-image (imago Dei), 
denying that images of the self and images of God could be distinguished in practice 
(1951/1968b, para. 42; cf. paras. 73, 320). Images of conjoined opposites and of deities, both 
Western and Eastern, are other symbolizations of the self commonly discussed by Jung.12  
 The Jungian analyst Warren Colman (2006), in an essay on Jung’s concept of the self, 
writes: “The idea that mystical experience is the result of a shift in centre from the ego (which is 
the centre of consciousness) to the self (which is the centre of conscious and unconscious) is 
actually one of [Jung’s] most brilliantly original insights, offering explanation of the very 
unexplainable quality of such experiences” (pp. 157–158). More specifically, the archetype of 
the self seems a promising resource for explaining introvertive mystical experience, inasmuch as 
all of the characteristics of introvertive mysticism identified by Stace are reflected in Jung’s 
characterizations of the archetype of the self. Reflecting Stace’s “sense of objectivity or reality,” 
Jung describes the self as “the objectivity of the psyche” (1944/1968c, para. 32). Where Stace 
identifies the importance of intense emotional experiences such as “blessedness” and “peace,” 
Jung (1963/1995) relates how, in his own case, the experiences that led him to understand that 
“the goal of psychic development is the self” gave him “stability” and “inner peace” and 
“satisfied [him] completely” (pp. 222, 224); while in the case of one of his patients (now known 
to be Wolfgang Pauli), a vision of the self in the form of a mandala of “the world clock” left the 
patient with “an impression of ‘the most sublime harmony’” (1944/1968c, para. 308). Regarding 
Stace’s “Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine,” this is reflected in Jung’s frequent description of 
the “numinous” nature of archetypes (1951/1968b, para. 305), not least in the case of the 
archetype of the self (1951/1968b, para. 124; 1955–1956/1970a, para. 776). Paradoxicality, 
another characteristic of introvertive mystical experiences for Stace, regularly occurs in Jung’s 
discussions of the self (1944/1968c, para. 20, 22; 1951/1968b, para. 124, 224; 1946/1966a, para. 
532) and indeed occupies an entire chapter of Mysterium Coniunctionis (1955–1956/1970a, 
paras. 36–103, especially paras. 36–39; cf. para. 4). Likewise, Stace’s characteristic of 
ineffability appears regularly when Jung is discussing the self—through the use of epithets such 
as “indescribable,” “inconceivable,” and “irrepresentable” (1955–1956/1970a, para. 181, cf. 
paras. 771, 777, 787; 1944/1968c, para. 20; 1951/1968b, para. 171), and indeed “ineffable” itself 
(1955–1956/1970a, para. 771). 
 The preceding characteristics are those that introvertive mystical experience shares with 
extrovertive mystical experience. What about those that Stace considers distinctive to 
introvertive experience? Just as, according to Stace, introvertive mystical experience can have a 
nonspatial and nontemporal character, so too can experience of the self. The nonspatial or space-
transcending character of the self is suggested, albeit using spatial terms, by Jung’s paradoxical 
statement that, “As an individual phenomenon, the self is ‘smaller than small’; as the equivalent 
of the cosmos, it is ‘bigger than big’” (1940/1968g, para. 289; cf. 1934/1954/1968a, para. 45). 
Regarding the self’s nontemporal character, he writes that “the spontaneous manifestations of the 
self, i.e., the appearance of certain symbols relating thereto, bring with them something of the 
timelessness of the unconscious which expresses itself in a feeling of eternity and immortality. 
Such experiences can be extraordinarily impressive” (1946/1966a, para. 531). We could also 
invoke here Jung’s concept of synchronicity, the principle of acausal connection through 
meaning (1952/1969i). The concepts of the self and synchronicity are deeply implicated with 
each other, and indeed were developed more or less at the same time, even though Jung only 
published about synchronicity much later than he published about the self (Coward, 1996; Main, 
2019, pp. 68–69). As Harold Coward (1996) has clarified, synchronicity is “a fundamental 
principle underlying the archetypes and the way in which the opposites within and without the 
psyche interact” and as such is “a basic building block for Jung’s concept of the self” (p. 489). 
The relevance of the connection here is that one of Jung’s ways of considering synchronicity was 
as “a psychically conditioned relativity of space and time” (1952/1969i, para. 840). To Mircea 
Eliade he described synchronicity as a “rupture of time,” which “closely resembles numinous 
experiences, where space, time, and causality are abolished” (McGuire & Hull, 1978, p. 230). 
The inherently synchronistic nature of the archetype of the self would therefore account for its 
nonspatial and nontemporal character.13 
 Finally, there is Stace’s “Unitary Consciousness; the One, the Void; pure consciousness” 
(1960/1973, p. 131). Relevant to this is above all Jung’s statement about the mandala: that it 
“symbolizes, by its central point, the ultimate unity of all archetypes as well as of the multiplicity 
of the phenomenal world” (1955–1956/1970a, para. 661). A “central point” symbolizing an 
“ultimate unity” of the archetypal and phenomenal worlds is certainly evocative of the concept of 
“the One.” As for that One’s also being “the Void,” while the mandala is a geometrical image 
and to that extent not contentless, Jung was struck by the fact that many spontaneously produced 
modern mandalas had an empty centre, where traditionally there would have been a 
representation of a divinity or savior figure. In such cases, he writes, “The place of the deity 
seems to be taken by the wholeness of man” (1938/1940/1969g, para. 139). The particular 
mandala Jung had in mind in making this statement was Pauli’s vision of the world clock, and 
Pauli himself endorsed the idea of the “empty centre,” referring to it in his correspondence as 
“Zentrum der Leere” (“the center of the void”) (Gieser, 2005, p. 190). In a letter to Pastor Walter 
Bernet (June 13, 1955), Jung (1976) elaborated, with implicit reference to mandalas: 
 
With increasing approximation to the centre there is a corresponding 
depotentiation of the ego in favour of the influence of the “empty” centre, which 
is certainly not identical with the archetype but is the thing the archetype points 
to. As the Chinese would say, the archetype is only the name of Tao, not Tao 
itself. Just as the Jesuits translated Tao as “God,” so we can describe the 
“emptiness” of the centre as “God.” Emptiness in this sense doesn’t mean 
“absence” or “vacancy,” but something unknowable which is endowed with the 
highest intensity. (p. 258) 
 
The mandala, then, can symbolize the self as a One that is also a Void. So, too, can the self’s 
expression through synchronicity, similarly by way of associations with Tao. “The realization of 
Tao has this quality of being in a sort of synchronistic relation with everything else,” Jung is 
recorded as saying during his Visions seminars of 1930 to 1934, adding: “that is the general 
mystical experience, the coincidence of the individual condition with the universe, so that the 
two become indistinguishable” (1988, p. 608; cf. 1935/1977k, para. 143). Regarding the void or 
the experience of the “vacuum-plenum,” Jung, quoting the Tao Te Ching of Lao-tzu and 
commentary by Richard Wilhelm, suggests that synchronicity, like Tao, involves the experience 
of a kind of emptiness or “nothing” (1952/1969i, paras. 918–920). He notes in particular 
Wilhelm’s explanation that, in Tao, “the opposites ‘cancel out in non-discrimination,’ but are still 
potentially present” (para. 921, quoting Wilhelm).14 
 This paralleling of Jung’s characterizations of the archetype of the self with Stace’s 
characterization of introvertive mystical experience suggests that Jung’s model does have 
theoretical resources to account for introvertive mystical experience. However, the limitations 
flagged by Kelly and Grosso have not yet been directly addressed. The first of these limitations is 
that the experience of the archetype of the self seems, according to Jung’s model, to be an 
experience only of an image of the self, however impressive such an image may be in terms of its 
associated characteristics and especially in its form as a mandala. 
 
The Unus Mundus 
 
In his later, post-1944 work, Jung stressed the distinction between the “archetype as such,” on 
the one hand, and “archetypal image” or “archetypal representations (images and ideas),” on the 
other (1947/1954/1969c, para. 417). The archetype as such, which designates “the real nature of 
the archetype,” is, Jung claimed, “not capable of being made conscious,” it is “transcendent,” 
and for this reason he referred to it as not psychic but “psychoid.” The archetypal image, by 
contrast, is how the archetype appears in consciousness. Such an image is necessarily inflected to 
some degree by the conditions of its manifestation, including the experiencer’s personal, social, 
and cultural context, and hence the image expresses the archetype as such “only approximately.” 
There can thus be innumerable different archetypal images expressing the same archetype as 
such, like “a set of variations on a ground theme.” The archetype as such can be reasonably 
inferred on the basis of these manifestations, but it cannot be known directly (para. 417). In 
relation to the present theme, this seems to imply that the self cannot be experienced directly but 
only through its representations in consciousness, such as mandala images. 
 Influencing Jung’s thought in distinguishing between archetypes as such and archetypal 
images was his lifelong, professed adherence to Kant’s epistemology and its distinction between 
noumena (“things in themselves”) and phenomena (“things as they appear”).15 But as several 
commentators have demonstrated, Jung’s adherence to Kant was not as strict as he liked to claim 
(Bishop, 2000; de Voogd, 1984; Main, 2007, pp. 32–36). In particular, Jung does in practice 
seem to have allowed for the possibility of directly experiencing archetypes, at least at the 
culminating stage of individuation. This possibility is most pertinently expressed in the final 
chapter of Mysterium Coniunctionis (1955–1956/1970a, paras. 654–789), where Jung frames the 
process of individuation in terms of the thought of the sixteenth-century alchemist Gerhard Dorn 
(ca. 1530–1584). 
 Dorn described the alchemical process as involving a series of three conjunctions. The 
first conjunction, which he called the unio mentalis (“mental union”), consists of a union of spirit 
and soul (paras. 664–676). Dorn considered that in the natural human state there was “an 
inextricable interweaving of the soul with the body, which together formed a dark unity (the unio 
naturalis),” variously referred to by the alchemists as “the nigredo [blackness], the chaos, the 
massa confusa [confused mass]” (para. 696). Jung describes it as “The original, half-animal state 
of unconsciousness” (para. 696). However, through the operation of spirit—that is, through the 
discriminating power of “conscious and rational insight”—it is possible to extract the soul from 
its “enchainment” to the body, to free it from “its fetters in the things of sense,” and thus “to set 
up a rational, spiritual-psychic position over against the turbulence of the emotions,” a position 
“immune to the influences of the body” (para. 696). In Jung’s psychological and 
psychotherapeutic terms, this “overcoming of the body” involves “making conscious and 
dissolving the projections that falsify the patient’s view of the world and impede his self-
knowledge” (paras. 696, 673). Acquiring greater self-knowledge (paras. 674, 711) brings 
neurotic symptoms “under the control of consciousness” and fosters “inner certainty” and “self-
reliance” (para. 756). 
 The unio mentalis is, as Jung notes, “purely intrapsychic” (para. 664); it is a state of 
“interior oneness” (para. 670). As such, it leaves the body and the material world unintegrated. 
Indeed, as Jung elaborates, it results in a deep split of the unified spirit and soul from matter and 
the body (para. 664). Jung does not for this reason denigrate the process, which he considers 
“indispensable for the differentiation of consciousness” (para. 672). However, since it was the 
soul that animated the body, a consequence of the soul’s separation from the body by its union 
with spirit is that “the body and its world” appear “dead” (para. 742). The problem confronting 
the alchemists was how to reanimate the body by reuniting it with the soul in a way that was not 
simply a return to the confusion of the unio naturalis (para. 742). This was the task of Dorn’s 
second conjunction. 
 In Dorn’s terms, the solution to the problem of how to reunite the unio mentalis with the 
body was the alchemical process resulting in production of the caelum, the “heaven,” “the 
kingdom of heaven on earth,” “a heavenly substance in the body,” the “blue quintessence” 
(paras. 691–963, 703–706, 757–758, 764). Dorn described various alchemical procedures for the 
production of this mysterious substance (paras. 681–685), but in Jung’s interpretation such 
procedures are projected, symbolic expressions of the process of individuation and its facilitating 
method of active imagination (paras. 705–706); and the caelum itself, the product of the process, 
is a symbol of the self. As such, the caelum was the imago Dei, the image of God, which could 
also be symbolized by the mandala (paras. 716–719, 757) and by the central alchemical figure of 
Mercurius, who, as both “matter and spirit,” symbolizes for Jung that the self “embraces the 
bodily sphere as well as the psychic” (para. 717) and indeed represents not only a 
“spiritualization” of matter but also a “materialization of the spirit” (para. 764). 
 Again, however, this is not the conclusion of the process. What the second conjunction 
achieved was “the representation of the self in actual and visible form”—through symbolic 
images—but this, for Dorn and for Jung, was “a mere rite d’entreé, as it were a propaedeutic 
action and mere anticipation of [the self’s] realization” (para. 759). The final realization, “a 
consummation of the mysterium coniunctionis,” could be expected “only when the unity of spirit, 
soul, and body [i.e., the self or “whole man” (para. 760)] [was] made one with the original unus 
mundus [‘one world’]” (para. 664). This was Dorn’s “third and highest degree of conjunction” 
(para. 760). 
 The concept of the unus mundus refers to “the potential world of the first day of creation, 
when nothing was yet ‘in actu,’ i.e., divided into two and many, but was still one” (para. 760); it 
is the mundus archetypus, the “archetypal world” (para. 761). Jung is clear that the state of being 
united with the unus mundus, made one with the “one world,” is not a case of “a fusion of the 
individual with his environment, or even his adaptation to it, but a unio mystica with the potential 
world” (para. 767). He emphasizes that this potential world “is not the world of sense” (para. 
767) but the “background of our empirical world,” the “transcendental psychophysical 
background” in which the conditions of empirical physical and psychical phenomena inhere 
(para. 769), “the eternal Ground of all empirical being” (para. 760). 
 Such a “potential world” sounds very much like “the womb of the universe” Jung 
experienced in his visions (1963/1995, p. 324). As “the original, non-differentiated unity of the 
world or of Being” (1955–1956/1970a, para. 660), the unus mundus clearly must also lack 
differentiated content and in that sense be “contentless.” What, then, about the possibility of 
directly experiencing it? Jung’s description of the unus mundus refers to it as “the primordial 
unconsciousness” (para. 660), which suggests that by default it is remote from experience. He 
acknowledges, as he had previously, that it can be “indirectly experienced via its manifestations” 
(para. 660), above all as the mandala (par. 661). Strikingly, though, on this occasion, at the end 
of his life and in his last major work, Jung seems to go further and to affirm that the unus 
mundus can also be experienced directly. He writes of the third conjunction: 
 
Not unnaturally, we are at a loss to see how a psychic experience of this kind—
for such it evidently was—can be formulated as a rational concept. Undoubtedly 
it was meant as the essence of perfection and universality, and, as such, it 
characterized an experience of similar proportions. We could compare this only 
with the ineffable mystery of the unio mystica, or tao, or the content of samadhi, 
or the experience of satori in Zen, which would bring us to the realm of the 
ineffable and of extreme subjectivity where all the criteria of reason fail. 
Remarkably enough this experience is an empirical one in so far as there are 
unanimous testimonies from the East and West alike, both from the present and 
from the distant past, which confirm its unsurpassable subjective significance. 
(para. 771, emphasis added) 
 
In affirming an experience comparable to the highest unitive achievements described in Christian 
mysticism, Taoism, Yoga, and Zen Buddhism, Jung is surely also affirming the possibility of 
experiencing a “universal core” of mysticism, including introvertive mystical states as defined 
and characterized by Stace. In Jung’s terms, such a state could be expressed as an experience not 
just of an archetypal image of the self but, rare but not impossible, of the archetype of the self as 
such.16 
 Yet difficulties remain. How does the unus mundus change from being a “primordial 
unconsciousness” to being a consciously experienced “One”? Often in mystical traditions this 
problem is resolved by assuming that the One is not unconscious but rather is supremely 
conscious and self-illuminating. What prevents that supreme consciousness from being realized 
is the ignorance or simply the activity of the ego, which as it were obscures the reality. When the 
ego is dissolved or appropriately stilled or aligned, then the supreme consciousness that was 
always there is disclosed. Such, for example, is the view expressed in Patanjali’s Yoga Sūtras 
(Whitney, 2017). Jung, however, does not take this explanatory path. In fact, as Leanne Whitney 
notes, he explicitly rejected the idea when Erich Neumann, commenting on a draft of part of 
Jung’s Memories, Dreams, Reflections, suggested to him that, “if the Self contemplates you as 
the ego, then the Self is not unconscious” (Whitney, 2017, p. 22, citing Jung & Neumann, 2015, 
p. 344).17 There will be more to say later about why Jung rejected the idea of the self’s being 
intrinsically conscious and self-illuminating. But first, it is necessary to get a fuller sense of what 
alternative explanation Jung can give of how experiences of the self, not least the union of the 
self with the unus mundus, can be conscious. In order to do this, we need to look more closely at 
the relation of the self to the ego and thereby address at last the second limitation of Jung’s 
model identified by Kelly and Grosso: its inability to account for how mystical experiences can 
be conscious, even superconscious, while involving the disappearance of the ordinary conscious 
ego, on which, according to Jung, consciousness depends. 
 
Self and Ego 
 
In his earlier work, Jung tended to emphasize the difference between the ego and the self, 
stressing that the former was the center only of consciousness, while the latter was the center of 
the psyche as a whole, consciousness and unconscious together (1921/1971, para. 623; 
1928/1966b, para. 400; 1944/1968c, para. 44). In his later work, while never contradicting this 
distinction (1955–1956/1970a, para. 133), Jung arguably softens it (Colman, 2006, pp. 160–161). 
Rather than presenting the ego as intrinsically different from the self—as different as the earth is 
from the sun (Jung, 1928/1966b, para. 400)—Jung sometimes now allowed that the ego could 
come to resemble the self. As he wrote in Aion (1951/1968b): “the more numerous and the more 
significant the unconscious contents which are assimilated to the ego, the closer the 
approximation of the ego to the self, even though this approximation must be a never-ending 
process” (para. 44). He also increasingly presented the ego as an integral part of the self. “The 
ego,” he wrote, “is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the 
whole” (para. 9; cf. 1928/1966b, para. 274; 1941/1968f, para. 315); similarly “the integrated 
contents [of the collective unconscious] are parts of the self” (1951/1968b, para. 43). More 
specifically, Jung sometimes referred to the ego as the “exponent” of the self (para. 350; 
1942/1954/1969j, para. 391). Most suggestively of all, in Mysterium Coniunctionis he wrote that 
the ego “is an essential part of the self, and can be used pars pro toto [as a part that stands for the 
whole] when the significance of consciousness is borne in mind” (1955–1956/1970a, para. 133). 
 For Jung, then, the conscious self is a whole that comprises the ego and archetypes as its 
parts. Sometimes Jung refers just to the ego and the shadow; other times he refers to the ego, 
shadow, anima/animus, and collective unconscious (para. 129n66). However, since the shadow 
enfolds or mediates the anima/animus, and the anima/animus enfolds or mediates the collective 
unconscious, these are both shortcut formulations for the idea that the self is a whole that 
encompasses all the parts of the psyche (1951/1968b, para. 43). An important implication of such 
holistic formulations is that the ego is inherent in the conscious self. Indeed, since for Jung 
consciousness depends on the ego, it is by dint of the ego’s being integrated within the self that 
the self can be conscious. 
 Before the integration of the ego with the shadow, anima/animus, and other archetypes of 
the collective unconscious, the self cannot be consciously experienced. Or rather, one could say 
that, from the perspective of a person predominantly identified with the ego, the self, if it is 
experienced, is likely to be experienced as contaminated with the nonintegrated contents of the 
shadow, anima/animus, and other archetypes. The self when contaminated with nonintegrated 
contents of the shadow would be experienced as dark, cognitively, emotionally, and ethically. 
The self when contaminated with nonintegrated contents of the anima/animus and of other 
archetypes of the collective unconscious would be experienced as dangerously alluring, 
overwhelming, and potentially destructive. In other words, the unconscious self would be 
experienced in precisely the kinds of ways highlighted by Kelly and Grosso (2007, p. 557; cf. 
Kelly, 2015, pp. 545–546).  
 However, the more the ego is integrated with the shadow, anima/animus, and collective 
unconscious generally, the more the self can be consciously experienced without darkening and 
engulfment. In such conscious experience of the self, the ego is relativized, so that it is no longer 
the dominant center of identity, but rather is that part of the self that gives consciousness to 
identity (1947/1954/1969c, paras. 430–432). Such is the “Conscious wholeness” that consists, 
for Jung, in “a successful union of ego and self, so that both preserve their intrinsic qualities” 
(para. 430n128). 
 The actual transformation from an ordinary, ego-centered to a vastly amplified, holistic 
sense of self can be accounted for in terms of the connection between the self and synchronicity, 
and in particular Jung’s claim that synchronistic experiences involve “getting rid of the 
incommensurability between observed and observer” so as to reveal “a unity of being” 
(1952/1969i, para. 960). With reference to divinatory procedures, Jung argues that the 
perspective of synchronicity provides a method of “grasping a situation as a whole” (para. 863) 
and “thinking in terms of the whole” (para. 924; cf. para. 961). If the division (or 
“incommensurability”) has been removed between the observed object, in this case the grasped 
or thought-about “whole,” and the observing subject, then this suggests how it can be that, as 
Jung says happened during his mystical visions, “One is interwoven into an indescribable whole 
and yet observes it with complete objectivity” (1963/1995, p. 327; cf. 1934/1954/1968a, paras. 
45–46). Such a breakdown of the distinction between the observer and the observed could be 
described as an experience of the self in the paradoxical double sense of being both what the self 
as subject experiences and how the self as object is experienced. 
 Jung’s psychological model is thus able to account for the transformation from an ego-
centered sense of identity to a sense of identity centered in the self, as well as for how the self 
and all that it is capable of experiencing, including all the characteristics of introvertive mystical 
experience, can be conscious. On the one hand, this conscious self may be experienced as 
egoless, inasmuch as the ego, having been integrated and thereby decentered, no longer forms 
the primary locus of identity. On the other hand, the conscious self clearly is not strictly egoless, 
since the ego has been integrated and decentered rather than, as strict egolessness would require, 
dissolved or extinguished. For Jung, the remaining presence of the ego, even if completely 
unobtrusive, is essential if the experiencing self is to be conscious. It is important to be clear that 
this implies the dependence of the consciousness of the self on a factor, the ego, that is itself not 
an archetype but is “acquired, empirically speaking, during the individual’s lifetime” 
(1951/1968b, para. 6); and that is, moreover, dependent on the body, inasmuch as it arises from 
and is sustained by a combination of somatic as well as psychic stimuli, from both inner and 
outer sources, many of them subliminal (paras. 3, 6). Why would Jung insist that consciousness 
depends on such a factor when the simple alternative of ascribing intrinsic consciousness to the 
self was available to him, and indeed had been expressly recommended by Neumann? To answer 
this question we need to consider Jung’s implicit metaphysics.	
 
Jung’s Implicit Metaphysics 
 
One of the most important findings of Beyond Physicalism was that theoretical frameworks—
scientific or religious, modern or ancient, Western or Eastern—that are genuinely open to 
accommodating well-testified evidence of extraordinary phenomena tend to be underpinned, 
explicitly or implicitly, by a panentheistic metaphysics (Kelly, 2015, p. 538; Main, 2015, pp. 
252–253). Panentheism is a particular view, or family of views, of the relationship between God 
(the Divine, Ultimate Reality, the One, the Absolute, or however articulated) and the world (that 
is, the empirical world, the cosmos, the universe, nature). Composed of the Greek words “pan” = 
all, “en” = in, and “theos” = God, the term “panentheism” means literally “a doctrine [“-ism”] 
that everything exists in God.” The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Trumble & Stevenson, 
2002, p. 2080) defines it as “the belief or doctrine that God includes and interpenetrates the 
universe while being more than it.” Just as with other views of the relationship between God and 
the world, panentheism is not a single, clearly defined position but rather a set of related 
positions. Michael Brierley (2008) considers a range of characteristics and varieties, and offers a 
helpful generic definition in terms of the following three premises: “first, that God is not separate 
from the cosmos . . . ; second, that God is affected by the cosmos . . . ; and third, that God is 
more than the cosmos . . .” (pp. 639–640). Otherwise put, panentheism sees the relationship 
between God and the world as one not of strict separation and transcendence (as in classical 
theism) or of strict identity and immanence (as in classical pantheism) but of mutual coinherence 
and harmony between transcendence and immanence.18 
As I have argued in detail elsewhere (Main, 2017, pp. 1105–1111), Jung’s psychological 
model, which clearly shares the openness to extraordinary phenomena, can also be framed in 
terms of panentheism.19 Construing Jung’s psychological model as underpinned by a form of 
implicit panentheism depends on Jung’s effectively having equated the unconscious with God: 
“Recognising that [numinous experiences] do not spring from his conscious personality, [man] 
calls them mana, daimon, or God,” Jung wrote, adding, “Science employs the term 
‘unconscious’” (1963/1995, p. 368; cf. p. 369)—a position that is as much a sacralization of 
psychology as it is a psychologization of the sacred. With this equation between God and the 
unconscious in mind, we can note that Jung’s statements about God, or the God-image, in 
“Answer to Job” (1952/1969a) and elsewhere, clearly depict God as not separate from the world, 
as affected by the world, and as more than the world (paras. 631, 686, 758); and correlatively his 
statements about the unconscious clearly depict it as not separate from consciousness, as affected 
by consciousness, and as more than consciousness (paras. 538, 555, 557-58; 1963/1995, p. 358; 
Main, 2017, pp. 1108–1110). Indeed, a panentheistic structure informs many, perhaps all, of 
Jung’s signature concepts. For example, the transcendent archetype as such is not separate from, 
is affected by, and is more than the immanent archetypal image. In an open letter responding to 
what he saw as a mischaracterization of his work by Martin Buber (1878–1965), Jung even 
referred to the archetypes as “immanent–transcendent” (1952/1977j, para. 1505). Again, Jung’s 
conception of the symbol links together the transcendent unknown and the immanent known 
(1921/1971, paras. 814–829) in a way that could be expressed as mutual coinherence. As I shall 
elaborate shortly, a panentheistic structure can also be discerned in the relationship between the 
self and the ego.  
 That Jung was operating within an implicit metaphysics of panentheism is evident from 
his discussion of the three conjunctions of Dorn. He discusses the conjunctions as processes that 
do, or might, take place at the cultural as well as at the personal level. Thus, he equates the first 
conjunction, the unio mentalis or union of the spirit and soul in “the overcoming of the body,” 
with the achievement of Christianity (1955–1956/1970a, paras. 747, 773). This conjunction 
reflects the metaphysics of theism: the unified spirit–psyche is separate from the body (para. 
747), not affected by the body (para. 696), and more than the body in the senses of being 
implicitly considered both more real and more valuable (para. 673). Culturally, this condition 
results in an “apparently irremediable separation of spirit from nature and the body” (para. 664), 
a form of dualism in which “the body and its world” are experienced as “dead” (para. 742)—a 
description evocative of disenchantment (Main, 2017, pp. 1100–1104). 
 While Jung, like the alchemists, affirmed the value of the first conjunction, he also, like 
them, considered that “a new interpretation” of the archetypes was needed (1955–1956/1970a, 
para. 744), one in which “the world of natural bodies [would lay] claim to equality and hence to 
realization” (para. 747). For Jung, the processes of alchemy and its modern counterpart, 
individuation, were both attempts to establish such a renewed relationship between spirit and the 
body, and hence between God and the world—a relationship of union rather than of fundamental 
separateness. This “extremely difficult task of uniting the wayward physical man with his 
spiritual truth” (para. 774) was the second conjunction, and the goal it held out was essentially a 
panentheistic one: the spirit–psyche would be no longer separate from the body (paras. 764, 
766), would be affected by the body inasmuch as in “sublimating matter” the alchemist also 
“concretized spirit” (para. 764), and yet would remain more than the body in that the resulting 
unity, the caelum or self, was “a transcendental principle” (para 711). Only through such a 
panentheistic relationship between God and world, or between spirit–psyche and body, would the 
third conjunction of union between the self and the unus mundus become possible (para. 770). 
 In the light of the importance that Jung, like the alchemists, attached to “the body and its 
world” in this implicitly panentheistic outlook, we can understand the deeper import of Jung’s 
claims that consciousness depends on the ego. In Mysterium Coniunctionis, Jung refers to the 
ego, in terms familiar from his earlier work, as “the indispensable condition for all 
consciousness, the latter being nothing but the association of an object or a content with the ego” 
(para. 129). But in the same breath he also describes the ego more enigmatically as “a dark 
body” from which “our consciousness issues” (par. 129). He continues: “The ego, ostensibly the 
thing we know most about, is in fact a highly complex affair full of unfathomable obscurities. 
Indeed, one could even define it as a relatively constant personification of the unconscious itself, 
or as the Schopenhauerian mirror in which the unconscious becomes aware of its own face” 
(para. 129). Jung elaborates on the suggestion that the ego enables the unconscious to become 
“aware of its own face” with the following cosmogonic speculation: 
 
All the worlds that have ever existed before man were physically there. But they 
were a nameless happening, not a definite actuality, for there did not yet exist 
that minimal concentration of the psychic factor, which was also present, to 
speak the word that outweighed the whole of Creation: That is the world, and 
this is I! That was the first morning of the world, the first sunrise after the primal 
darkness, when that inchoately conscious complex, the ego, the son of the 
darkness, knowingly sundered subject and object, and thus precipitated the world 
and itself into definite existence, giving it and itself a voice and a name. (para. 
129) 
 
Rather than being as different from the self as the earth is from the sun (1928/1966b, para. 400), 
“the ego and its field of consciousness” are now described by Jung in alchemical terms precisely 
as “The refulgent body of the sun” (1955–1956/1970a, para. 129). Noting “the totality character 
of the sun-image” and “its frequent use as a God-image” (para. 130), Jung argues that, with this 
sun symbol, the alchemists were, albeit unwittingly, “establishing an intimate connection 
between God and the ego” and even “expressing an identity of God and ego” (para. 131). 
 Ever alert to the dangers of inflation, Jung tried to mitigate the grandiosity of these 
statements by claiming that, since they were expressions of the unconscious, “only unconscious 
nature can be accused of blasphemy but not the man who is its victim” (para. 131). In further 
mitigation, he points out that ideas such as these were “taken as self-evident” in India (para. 
131). He contrasts “the Indian mind,” whose “nature” it is “to become aware of the world-
creating significance of the consciousness manifested in man,” with “The West,” which “has 
always emphasized the littleness, weakness, and sinfulness of the ego” (para. 131). He notes the 
Indian solution of “merging the ego, the personal atman, with the universal atman and thus 
explaining the ego as the veil of Maya” (para. 132). This parallel enabled Jung to claim that the 
insights he was articulating were “not the arbitrary opinions of deranged minds” but expressions 
of “the nature of the psyche itself,” which operates in the same way “in East and West alike” 
(para. 132). Most interesting, however, is Jung’s acknowledgment that in other writings he had 
presented a similar argument, “Only there it was not a question of ego but of the self, or rather, of 
the personal atman in contradistinction and in relation to the suprapersonal atman” (para. 133). 
He stresses that the implicit parallel he is now drawing between the ego and the personal atman 
does not contradict the parallel he drew in earlier work between the self and the personal atman. 
For, in the formulation quoted previously, the ego “is an essential part of the self, and can be 
used pars pro toto when the significance of consciousness is borne in mind” (para. 133). 
 This unexpected elevation of the ego into something cosmogonic, divine, and (at least to 
some extent) substitutable for the self can, I think, best be understood in terms of Jung’s implicit 
panentheism. First, the partial substitutability of the ego for the self reflects the closer 
relationship between the world and God in panentheism than in theism. The radical difference 
between ego and self that was emphasized in Jung’s earlier writings (1928/1966b, para. 400) 
arguably reflects the theistic separation between the world and God, while the much closer 
relationship emphasized in his later formulations reflects the implicitly panentheistic perspective 
that was increasingly coming to inform his work.  
 Second, the connectedness and even identity of the ego with the divine reflects the 
nonseparation of the world and God in panentheism. This nonseparation is often expressed 
through the “panentheistic metaphor” or “analogy” of the world’s being God’s body (Brierley, 
2004, pp. 6–7; Cooper, 2006, pp. 311–313). It implies that the world, as an aspect of God, is also 
divine. That is to say, all the processes and transformations associated with empirical reality, 
including birth, growth, flourishing, decay, and death, are also expressions of the divine. Thus, 
the ego, though acquired during the individual’s lifetime, dependent on the body, and 
experienced as little, weak, and sinful, is nevertheless, as a part of “God’s body,” also divine. 
 Third, the cosmogonic significance that Jung ascribes to the ego reflects the importance 
that is ascribed to the world in panentheism. In panentheism the world is needed for God’s 
conscious realization (Brierley, 2004, pp. 9–10). For some versions of panentheism, such as 
those based on process philosophy, God’s self-realization need not have taken place, or be taking 
place, through this exact world, since the world is contingent; but some contingent world is 
necessary (Cooper, 2006, p. 183; cf. Göcke, 2018, pp. 177–182). Correspondingly, Jung came to 
believe that the empirical ego, contingent as it is and dependent on the body, is necessary for 
making conscious the self; and since the self for Jung is indistinguishable from the God-image, 
this amounted to the ego’s bringing the world, and hence God’s immanence, out of a state of 
unconsciousness into a state of conscious realization (1963/1995, pp. 370–372). In the light of 
this belief, or “explanatory myth” (p. 371), of Jung’s, we can understand why he rejected 
Neumann’s suggestion that the self is intrinsically conscious. For Jung (1976), the contribution 
of human consciousness to the realization of the divine gave human life its meaning: 
  
Since a creation without the reflecting consciousness of man has no discernible 
meaning, the hypothesis of a latent meaning endows man with a cosmogonic 
significance, a true, raison d’être. If on the other hand the latent meaning is 
attributed to the Creator as part of a conscious plan of creation, the question 
arises: Why should the Creator stage-manage this whole phenomenal world since 
he already knows what he can reflect himself in, and why should he reflect 
himself at all since he is already conscious of himself? Why should he create 
alongside his own omniscience a second, inferior consciousness—millions of 
dreary little mirrors when he knows in advance just what the image they reflect 
will look like? (p. 495)20 
 
In sum, just as in panentheistic metaphysics the world is essential for God’s conscious 
realization, so, in the more psychological terms of Jung’s thought, the ego, despite all its 
limitations, is essential for conscious realization of the self. 
 Finally, returning to the question of introvertive mystical experience, we can see, in 
relation to Jung’s implicit panentheism, why it has been so difficult both to isolate the 
introvertive moment within his experience and then to explain it within his theory. Jung, it 
appears, experienced introvertive mystical states; his theoretical model ultimately has resources 
to explain such states; and, significantly, subsequent scholars have been able fruitfully to explore 
his work in relation to mystics for whom introvertive experiences were central (Dourley, 2014a; 
Henderson, 2014; Stein, 2014). But Jung’s own deep inclinations were not toward the cultivation 
of introvertive mystical states. When he discusses mysticism, his emphasis tends to be toward 
more visionary than contemplative, more “numinous” than “luminous,” more “hot” than “cool” 
varieties (Schlamm, 2006; Smart, 1997, pp. 175–176, 189), even toward prophetic varieties 
(Kingsley, 2018). This probably reflects Jung’s panentheistic orientation: he did not consider the 
transcendent pole of mystical experience, culminating in a sense of pure, egoless, contentless 
consciousness, more important than its immanent pole, in which the divine can manifest itself in 
and through creation.21 
 Jung framed the ultimate concern of his life and work in various ways, but in each way 
transcendence is balanced with immanence. One way he framed “the decisive question” was 
whether or not we are related to “something infinite” (1963/1995, p. 357). In this context, he 
argued (p. 358) that awareness of our limited nature is essential if we are to realize the “feeling 
for the infinite” and for “boundlessness” in our relationships: “In knowing ourselves to be unique 
in our personal combination—that is, ultimately limited—we possess also the capacity for 
becoming conscious of the infinite. But only then!” 
 Another way he expressed the aim of his works, as well as of the “images in which [he 
had] lived” was as “fundamentally nothing but attempts, ever renewed, to give an answer to the 
question of the interplay between the ‘here’ and the ‘hereafter’” (1963/1995, p. 330). That Jung 
did not denigrate the limited “here” in favor of the boundlessness of the “hereafter” is powerfully 
shown by the myth of the afterlife that he developed, in which he speculated that “the souls of 
the dead” are “dependent on the living for receiving answers to their questions, that is, on those 
who have survived them and exist in a world of change” (1963/1995, p. 339); for “Only here, in 
life on earth, where the opposites clash together, can the general level of consciousness be raised. 
That seems to be man’s metaphysical task” (p. 343). 
 A third way in which Jung framed the “goal” of his life was as an attempt to find a myth 
that could fit humanity “meaningfully into the scheme of creation” (p. 371). The myth he found 
was, as we have seen, precisely the panentheistic one of how humanity’s “reflecting 
consciousness,” through reconciling “the opposites within the God-image,” enables “the Creator 
[to] become conscious of His creation,” thereby bringing about what is, Jung writes, effectively a 
“second cosmogony” (p. 371). 
 Fourth and last, Jung framed his ultimate concern as a quest for wholeness (1963/1995, p. 
222; Smith, 1990). As expressed most magisterially in his last major work, Mysterium 
Coniunctionis (1955–1956/1970a), this sought-after wholeness included not only the 
achievement of an “interior oneness” (para. 670), however spiritual (the first conjunction), but 
also the reuniting of that spiritual–psychic oneness with the body and its world, in order that “the 
insights gained should be made real” (para. 679) (the second conjunction). In a further stage, the 
resulting “unity of spirit, soul, and body” (par. 664) might then be united with the unus mundus, 
the “potential world,” “archetypal world,” or “eternal Ground of all empirical being” (paras. 760, 
761) (the third conjunction). Experience of this ultimate unity or wholeness, which, as we have 
seen, Jung did believe possible, could include all the attributes of introvertive mystical 
experience, as identified by Stace, but it was also, crucially, a unity that did not erase but 
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1 Jung’s full account of his mystical near-death experience appears in Chapter 10 of Memories, 
Dreams, Reflections (1963/1995, pp. 320–329). He also described the experience, in much more 
condensed form and with a few minor differences or additions of detail, in a letter to Kristine 
Mann (February 1, 1945), who was then dying of cancer (Jung, 1973, pp. 358–359). In her 
biography of Jung, Deirdre Bair (2004) discusses the context of the experiences (pp. 496–502). 
According to Bair, the content of the account of Jung’s mystical near-death experiences 
 
contained in the manuscript version of Memories, Dreams, Reflections (the so-called Protocols) 
“closely follows the [published] version in Chapter 10 of MDR, but the language is much more 
earthy and direct. The language of MDR has been not only refined but also interlaced with 
elaborations and clarifications that are not found in the Protocols or in any supporting 
documentation [consulted by Bair]” (2004, p. 811n3). While a certain caution may be needed 
regarding the weight given to particular expressions, Jung’s account appears to be otherwise 
fairly reliable. For other discussions of Jung’s mystical near-death experience, see Shamdasani 
(2008), Drob (2010, pp. 207–227), Dourley (2014b), and Stephens (2020, pp. 23–27). 
2 See, for example, Jung (1905/1977h, 1920/1948/1969f, 1934/1969h, 1938/1977c, 1948/1977i, 
1950/1977d, 1950–1955/1977f, 1951/1969d, 1954/1977g, 1957/1977b, 1958/1977a, 
1960/1977e). 
3 Marshall (2005) offers a fine critique of many aspects of Stace’s typology of mystical 
experiences (pp. 147–167). Nevertheless, since experiences of the type Stace calls introvertive 
have been and continue to be reported, the question remains of whether and how Jung’s thought 
could account for such experiences. 
4 A much richer list of typical features of extrovertive mystical experiences can be found in 
Marshall (2005, p. 27). Jung’s account (1963/1995, pp. 320–329) includes almost all of the 
features mentioned there. The focus of the present chapter, however, is on those elements of 
Jung’s experience that contribute to its qualifying as introvertive. 
5 As Marshall notes (2005, p. 56), Stace is inconsistent in including altered temporality or 
nontemporality as a distinguishing characteristic of introvertive experiences, for this quality can 
also be found in some of Stace’s own most detailed cases of experiences that he designates as 
extrovertive. 
 
6 In this chapter I focus on the mystical rather than the near-death aspects of Jung’s experience. 
Given my focus on introvertive mysticism, I also do not engage here in analysis of the rich 
content of Jung’s experiences. Either of these alternative approaches to the material would 
warrant a study in itself. 
7 I thank Paul Marshall for drawing my attention to this distinction. 
8 As an addendum, it is also worth noting that Jung’s experiences included qualities that are not 
emphasized by Stace but arguably should have been. Perhaps the most significant of these 
omissions by Stace is the lack of any reference to noetic quality. As Marshall (2005) comments, 
the omission is “a major shortcoming because heightened knowledge, understanding, or meaning 
is commonly reported” (p. 55). In Jung’s experience, this quality is strongly emphasized. For 
example, there is his sense that, had he entered the temple on the meteorite in his vision, he 
would have learned the real meaning of his life (1963/1995, p. 322); his apparent foreknowledge 
of his doctor’s imminent death (p. 324); and his explicit claim that his experience gave him 
access to a form of “objective cognition,” which he says “lies hidden behind the attraction of the 
emotional relationship,” is “the central secret,” and alone makes possible “the real coniunctio” 
(p. 328). 
9 Jung conducted a seminar on visions between 1930 and 1934 (1988). The visions discussed 
were primarily the result of exercises in active imagination, as were Jung’s own visions in The 
Red Book (2009). 
10 Jung’s “Psychological commentary on ‘The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation’” carries the 
date “(1939/1954).” However, the date “1954” in this case refers not to a revision but to the date 
of first publication of an essay written in 1939, as explained in an editors’ note (Jung, 
1939/1954/1969e, p. 475n1).  
 
11 For a helpful collection of secondary literature on Jung’s thought, see Young–Eisendrath and 
Dawson (1997/2008). For contextual background, see especially Shamdasani (2003). 
12 For more on Jung and wholeness, see Smith (1990), Main (2019), and Main, McMillan, and 
Henderson (2021). 
13 Synchronicity is the principal concept that enables Jung’s psychological model to account for 
extraordinary or paranormal experiences generally (Jung, 1952/1969i; Main, 1997, 2012). 
Demonstrating the full contribution of synchronicity to accounting also for mystical experiences, 
through its close implication with the concept of the self, would help to establish the continuity 
of paranormal and mystical phenomena in Jung’s understanding (cf. Marshall, 2015, pp. 40–43). 
However, such a task is beyond the scope of the present chapter. 
14 Jung arguably also has in mind here what he had written in 1916 in the first of his “Seven 
Sermons to the Dead” (Septem Sermones ad Mortuos) (in Jung, 2009, pp. 346–348) about the 
Pleroma (the “fullness”). The sermon opens: “Now hear: I begin with nothingness. Nothingness 
is the same as the fullness . . . We call this nothingness or fullness the Pleroma. Therein both 
thinking and being cease, since the eternal and endless possess no qualities” (Jung, 2009, pp. 
346–347). The scholar of Gnosticism Gilles Quispel reports that, much later, after Jung had 
presented his concept of synchronicity for the first time at the 1951 Eranos conference, he 
seemed “quite relieved and unusually good humoured.” Quispel continues: “All his life he had 
rummaged in the collective unconscious, but now he had forced a breakthrough from the soul to 
the cosmos. He beamed when he told me: ‘Es geht um die Erfahrung der Fülle des Seins’; it is 
the experience of the fullness, the pleroma, of Being that matters” (1995, p. 19). 
15 A wry comment of Marshall’s (2005) in relation to how Rudolf Otto’s theorization of 
mysticism was hampered by his Kantian commitments applies equally to Jung: “Kantian 
 
philosophy is not the most congenial environment in which to pursue a metaphysics of mystical 
experience.” (p. 142). 
16 Harald Atmanspacher similarly draws on Jung’s use of Dorn’s three conjunctions to argue that 
unitary reality can be directly experienced (2021, pp. 157–161). So, too, does Murray Stein 
(2014) in his Jungian interpretation of the Zen ox-herding pictures, specifically in relation to the 
ninth picture (p. 124). For a description of what the perspective of a person united with the unus 
mundus might be like, see Jung’s letter to Pauli of December 1956 (Meier, 2001, pp. 156–157). 
17 For Neumann’s own Jung-influenced interpretation of mysticism, see Neumann (1948/1968) 
and Marshall (2005, p. 217). 
18 For fuller discussion of panentheism, see Atmanspacher and von Sass (2017), Biernacki and 
Clayton (2014), Brierley (2004), Clayton and Peacocke (2004), Cooper (2006), and Göcke 
(2018, 2019). 
19 Jung generally disclaimed that he engaged in metaphysics, which is why I have referred to his 
metaphysics here as implicit. In identifying panentheism as Jung’s implicit metaphysics, I do not 
do so exclusively. Panpsychic emergentism (Cambray, 2009), process philosophy (Haule, 2011), 
dual-aspect monism (Atmanspacher, 2012, 2021), and objective idealism (Kastrup, 2021) have 
all been illuminatingly applied to Jung’s thought. Each of these metaphysical models is, 
however, compatible with an overarching framework of panentheism.  
20 Neumann (Jung & Neumann, 2015) had in fact argued (18 February 1959) that the same 
outcome of rendering human life meaningful could be achieved on the assumption that the self 
was intrinsically, even if not absolutely, conscious: “If we humans are complexes of the divine 
unconscious, which he or it becomes conscious of while we make conscious our individuality 
with our human consciousness, the accent on the individual would be still greater without our 
 
having to formulate the Self or God as unconscious” (p. 344). Jung responded (March 10, 1959) 
that his view of the unconsciousness of God was not just an idea but was based on “a most 
painful experience of almost immeasurable impact that cannot easily be debated” (p. 348). 
21 Neumann (1948/1968), influenced by Jung, places a similar emphasis on what he calls an 
“immanent world-transforming mysticism,” in which the numinous is experienced in the world 
“everywhere and at all times” (p. 414). He contrasts this with what he calls “nihilistic uroboros 
mysticism,” in which the mystic rejects the world (pp. 397–401; see also Marshall, 2005, p. 217). 
